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ABSTRACT 
Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally 
valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The 
argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and 
Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting 
and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are far more effective 
strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. Moreover, we point out that 
those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing will generally regard the deaths 
of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded embryos, aborted embryos or 
embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails these other embryos must be taken into account 
when considering moral obligations, as well as other human lives at risk from preventable causes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, Rob Lovering has developed several arguments that challenge the plausibility of 
the account of human persons known as the substance view, which asserts that all human beings 
are of equal value, whether they are embryos or adults.1 He has now developed an interesting new 
argument, which he refers to as the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption, and which 
we will refer to as the moral argument.2 
 
Lovering’s moral argument draws on two of his previous arguments. The embryo rescue argument 
claims it is strongly counterintuitive to rescue ten frozen embryos instead of a five-year-old human 
being, and hence serves as a reductio argument against the substance view.3 The embryo mortality 
argument notes that a high percentage of pregnancies end in spontaneous abortion, resulting in the 
deaths of many millions of human beings each year.4 Lovering suggests that substance view 
proponents have a strong moral obligation to act to reduce these deaths—which he contends is 
absurd and hence another reductio. Further, they fail to act in ways that will mitigate spontaneous 
abortion, implying either that they are acting immorally or they do not hold their views regarding 
the intrinsic value of all human beings seriously.5  
 
1 See Lovering, R. (2013). The substance view: a critique. Bioethics 27(5): 263-70, Lovering, R. (2014). The substance 
view: a critique (part 2). Bioethics 28(7): 378-86, and Lovering, R. (2017). The substance view: a critique (part 3). 
Bioethics 31(4): 305-12. 
2 Lovering, R. (2019). A moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. Bioethics [Epub ahead of print: 26 Nov 
2019] DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12671.  
3 Lovering (2014), op. cit. note 1 and Lovering (2017), op. cit. note 1. 
4 Lovering (2013), op. cit. note 1 and Lovering (2017), op. cit. note 1. 
5 Lovering (2017), op. cit. note 1, p. 268. 
Lovering’s moral argument combines elements of the embryo rescue argument and the embryo 
mortality argument—the idea of rescuing embryos from death from the former, and the moral 
obligations we might infer from the substance view from the latter. Although he avoids explicit 
mention of the substance view, its proponents are amongst his targets, as can be seen by his first 
premise—that “the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing.”6 As the substance view regards 
all human beings as equally valuable, and the death of a child or adult is generally thought of as a 
very bad thing, it follows that proponents of the substance view regard the death of an embryo as 
a very bad thing. Lovering proceeds to note that on this premise, there are millions of surplus 
embryos—valuable human beings—frozen at the very beginning of their lives, and in danger of 
being discarded and subsequently killed. Consequently, if the death of an embryo is thought to be 
very bad, he argues there is a moral obligation for at least some people to act to prevent at least 
one of these deaths.  
 
Lovering states that one possible use of his argument is to serve as a reductio ad absurdum of 
views that entail that the death of an embryo is a very bad thing. He suggests that it might also 
serve to show proponents of these views as acting in a manner that is morally criticizable or 
immoral—that they are being inconsistent with their beliefs.  
 
Here, we examine Lovering’s claims. After outlining the moral argument in detail, we respond in 
two parts. First, we challenge Lovering’s suggestion that the moral argument serves as a reductio 
 
6 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note 2, p. 2. We mention the first premise here, but will unpack the details of Lovering’s 
argument in the next section. 
for views (such as the substance view) that entail the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing. 
Second, we show that proponents of the substance view and others who regard the death of a frozen 
embryo as a very bad thing are not morally obliged to adopt and gestate frozen embryos—there 
are far more effective strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. 
Moreover, we point out that those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing 
will generally regard the deaths of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded 
embryos, aborted embryos or embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails these other embryos 
must be taken into account when considering moral obligations.  
 
THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR FROZEN EMBRYO ADOPTION 
 
Lovering’s moral argument proceeds as follows7: 
P1. The death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing. 
 
P2. Via embryo adoption, it is in some people’s power to prevent the death of at least one 
frozen embryo without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
significance. 
 
P3. If it is in one’s power to prevent something very bad from happening without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, one ought, morally speaking, 
to do so. 
 
C: Therefore, said people ought to prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via 
embryo adoption.  
 
As noted above, those who believe P1 (e.g., proponents of the substance view) often claim that the 
death of an embryo is comparable to the death of a born human being. Hence, such deaths are a 
 
7 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note 2, p. 2. 
“very bad thing.” For the sake of argument, Lovering grants that this “moral assessment of the 
death of a frozen embryo is correct.”8 
 
P2 has two parts: (i) some people can save at least one frozen embryo and (ii) this can be done 
without surrendering something “of comparable moral significance.” Claim (i) is uncontroversial. 
Claim (ii) requires an explanation. The death of a frozen embryo is, we are assuming, “a very bad 
thing.” But what “costs” come with the adoption process? Those Lovering lists include the 
financial cost of adoption, the costs of carrying an embryo to term, giving birth, and—if embryo 
adoption entails raising the child—all of the sacrifices associated with parenting more generally.9 
Believers in P1, Lovering claims, will usually take the death of an individual human being to be 
worse than the “negatives” listed here.10 Hence, P2 applies to those particular believers in P1 (i.e., 
those who think the death of a frozen embryo is worse than the “costs” of adoption). In their case, 
if they have the power to adopt, then they can do so without “sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral significance.” 
 
Lastly, P3 comes from Peter Singer. According to Singer, P3 is consistent with a wide range of 
moral perspectives.11 It aligns with consequentialist theories because it states that we ought to do 
good when, on balance, doing good comes with relatively little costs. It aligns with non-
consequentialist theories as well, Singer claims, “because the injunction to prevent what is bad 
 
8 Ibid: 5. 
9 Ibid: 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics, 3rd Ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
applies only when nothing comparably significant is at stake. Thus the principle cannot lead to the 
kinds of actions of which non‐consequentialists strongly disapprove.”12 In other words, should the 
non-consequentialist maintain that certain actions (e.g., adultery) are wrong, then when faced with 
the option of (a) saving a life, but violating one’s core moral commitments or (b) failing to save a 
life, but maintaining one’s core moral commitments, P3 permits them to select (b).  
 
Consequently, P1-P3, if accepted, together imply Lovering’s conclusion—that at least some people 
are obligated to adopt at least one frozen embryo.  
 
THE ABSURDITY CHARGE 
 
Before examining the moral argument in detail, we will briefly address Lovering’s absurdity 
charge; we have noted that Lovering suggests that the moral argument might serve “as a reductio 
ad absurdum of sorts against” P1.13 Clearly, he thinks the conclusion of the moral argument is 
absurd—that some people are obligated to adopt frozen embryos. But why think these types of 
moral obligation are absurd? There is nothing logically incoherent about them—they do not 
generate any contradiction. Lovering himself notes there are several organisations dedicated to 
adopting these embryos, which implies there are some people who believe this obligation is 
actionable, and clearly not absurd.  
 
 
12 Ibid: 199. 
13 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note 2, p. 2. 
As far as practices go today, adopting and gestating such an embryo may be perceived as wildly 
inconvenient. However, Lovering himself vigorously defends P3 against objections that its 
implications are too demanding or impractical14, and so perhaps he has another objection in mind. 
Either way, if there is a genuine absurdity that arises from P1, Lovering will need to articulate 
exactly what it is. Until then, we reject the notion that the moral argument is a reductio of views 
that accept P1 (e.g., the substance view). 
 
WHAT OBLIGATIONS DO P1 PROPONENTS HAVE? 
 
Lovering is clear that his moral argument is aimed at those who believe P1 (i.e., those who believe 
that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing) and so, we will examine the obligations P1-
believers should be willing to accept with regard to frozen embryos. Lovering claims in P2 that 
“via embryo adoption, it is in some people’s power to prevent the death of at least one frozen 
embryo without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.”15 He cites the 
Lims as an example—a couple who made considerable sacrifices to adopt and gestate two frozen 
embryos that would otherwise have been discarded.16 However, the Lims only demonstrate that 
the first part of P2 is true—clearly, it is in some people’s power to prevent the death of at least one 
frozen embryo. As noted above, this is an uncontroversial claim—it seems likely that many people, 
including the parents of frozen embryos, also have the power to prevent the death of at least one 
frozen embryo.  
 
14 Ibid: 7. 
15 Ibid: 2. 
16 Ibid: 4. 
 
The more pertinent part of P2 is Lovering’s implication that the moral sacrifices associated with 
gestating a frozen embryo are not comparable to the moral significance of preventing the death of 
a frozen embryo. We will grant that for P1-believers, this is also uncontroversial. What Lovering 
does not consider, however, is the opportunity cost of the sacrifices that are required for embryo 
adoption. Recalling from P1 that the primary obligation is to prevent the death of frozen embryos, 
perhaps adopting a frozen embryo is not the most effective approach to doing so. Presumably, 
most frozen embryos are discarded because the parents already have successfully had the children 
they desired or have given up on further attempts at IVF, and no longer wish to pay the storage 
costs of their surplus embryos.17 Rather than P1-believers gestating and adopting these embryos, 
in the short-term a more cost-effective approach might be to sponsor their storage, while also 
lobbying to change laws as discussed below. The lives of many more embryos could be extended 
with such a strategy, in comparison to direct adoption. Of course, eventually these embryos will 
need to be adopted, but this could buy time to judge the efficacy of other strategies to reduce the 
supply of frozen embryos and encourage adoption. The point remains, however, that immediate 
adoption may not be the most cost-effective means of saving frozen embryos.  
 
Given the widespread and growing use of IVF, it seems that the supply of surplus frozen embryos 
in the future will be inexhaustible.18 It seems far more conducive to the goal of preventing deaths 
to act in ways that will reduce or eliminate the supply of frozen embryos. For example, laws could 
 
17ReproTech—a company that specializes in long-term embryo storage—estimates that storage fees range from 
$350-$1,000 per year, depending on the facility. See ReproTech, Ltd. (2020). Embryo storage. URL = 
https://www.embryostorage.com/costs/.  
18 Ferraretti, A. P., Nygren, K., Andersen, A. N., de Mouzon, J., Kupka, M., … Calhaz-Jorge, C. (2017). Trends 
over 15 years in ART in Europe: an analysis of 6 million cycles. Human Reproduction Open, 2017(2): 1-10. 
be lobbied for that would prevent or discourage excess embryos being produced by IVF clinics, 
together with laws that prevent the destruction of surplus embryos, which if enacted, would remove 
the immediate threat of their disposal.19 Other possibilities include holding parents responsible for 
their embryos and requiring that excess embryos are made available for adoption. This latter point 
is especially pertinent if Lovering is correct that “only 6% of couples donate their excess 
embryos.”20 If this figure is correct, then the vast majority of parents are merely potential (i.e., not 
actual) donors (and so, this is something the P1-believer might work to change).  
 
Technology should also be considered—ectogenesis is developing rapidly21, and it may be that in 
a few years it is possible to gestate surplus embryos without requiring a human uterus. Of course, 
there may be ethical issues with doing so, but nonetheless, ectogenesis is a possibility well worth 
exploring because it promises to remove the physical sacrifices required by gestation away from 
prospective adoptive parents. Also, intercountry adoption is rapidly declining and may eventually 
be curtailed22, presumably making adoption more difficult and strengthening demand. It is likely 
there will be little difficulty finding adoptive parents for surplus embryos gestated via ectogenesis. 
Consequently, P1-believers could cultivate an interest in this area and perhaps sponsor its 
 
19 These types of laws are not without precedent either. Italy, for example, enacted legislation that “limited the number 
of embryos created during IVF to a maximum of three and required that all viable embryos be transferred into the 
patient’s uterus so no embryos would be stored or destroyed.” See Bayefsky, M.J. (2016). Comparative 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis policy in Europe and the USA and its implications for reproductive tourism. 
Reproductive Biomedicine and Society Online 3: 41-47, p. 42. Germany’s 1991 Embryo Protection law included the 
same types of restrictions, though it has recently been relaxed to allow for the use of PGD. See Bock von Wülfingen, 
B. (2016). Contested change: how Germany came to allow PGD. Biomedicine and Society Online 3: 60-7. 
20 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note 2, p. 1, n. 3. 
21 Usuda, H., Watanabe, S., Saito, M., Sato, S., Musk, G., Fee, E… Kemp, M. W. (2019). Successful use of an artificial 
placenta to support extremely preterm ovine fetuses at the border of viability. American Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, 221(69), e1–17. 
22 Selman, P. (2012). The global decline of intercountry adoption: what lies ahead? Social Policy and Society, 11(3), 
381–397. 
development in some way.23 Additionally, given Lovering’s claim that the likelihood of live birth 
following IVF is low (36%), it may actually save more lives if the P1-believer advocates for 
keeping excess embryos frozen until technology improves (and raises the likelihood to much more 
favorable levels). 
 
Emphasizing the importance of saving as many frozen embryos as possible raises a broader issue 
with regard to obligations towards embryos—P1-believers will generally also hold to a more 
general premise, which we will call P0: the death of an embryo is a very bad thing. A frozen 
embryo is but one category of human embryo in danger of losing its life. As Blackshaw and Rodger 
note, over 50 million embryos (and fetuses) are killed annually via induced abortion, and even 
more spontaneously abort, dwarfing the numbers of frozen embryos that are discarded annually.24 
P0-believers will surely consider that they have obligations to all embryos, and as Blackshaw and 
Rodger argue, efforts to prevent their deaths should be strategically directed to where they are most 
effective.  
 
This casts considerable doubt on P2—adopting a frozen embryo with all the attendant costs and 
time commitment may well mean sacrificing resources that could otherwise have been directed to 
combating induced abortion or spontaneous abortion, in addition to the strategies we have already 
discussed apart from adoption to deal with the frozen embryo problem. Importantly, these embryos 
are in far more imminent danger of losing their lives, as frozen embryos can seemingly be kept 
 
23 For more on the claim that (from the perspective of P1-believers) ectogenesis may be worth pursuing, see Kaczor, 
C. (2015). The ethics of abortion: women’s rights, human life, and the question of justice, 2nd Ed. New York: 
Routledge, pp. 245ff, and Simkulet, W. (2019). Abortion and ectogenesis: moral compromise. Journal of Medical 
Ethics [Epub ahead of print: 19 Sept 2019], DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105676.  
24 Blackshaw, B.P. and Rodger, D. (2019). The problem of spontaneous abortion: is the pro-life position morally 
monstrous? The New Bioethics 25(2), pp. 332-48. 
viable almost indefinitely.25 Each embryo lost to induced and spontaneous abortion is certainly of 
comparable moral significance to each frozen embryo, but their far greater numbers entail that 
these issues are of much important moral significance. Indeed, Lovering himself argues that P0-
believers are morally obligated to act on the issue of spontaneous abortion.26 
 
But why stop at saving embryos? P0- and P1-believers surely also believe that other human beings 
are of comparable moral significance. For example, imagine P1-believers buy into the “effective 
altruism” that lies in the background of P3. Singer’s “effective altruism” emphasizes the 
importance of doing the most good that one can do with one’s resources.27 Returning to Lovering’s 
argument, he notes that the cost of embryo adoption is somewhere around $8,000.28 GiveWell 
reports that as of November 2016, the median cost of saving one life via the Against Malaria 
Foundation is $3,162 (ranging from $532-$7,179 in individual cases).29 The P1-believer, therefore, 
has a choice: Spend $8,000 to save no more than one life (via embryo adoption) or spend that same 
$8,000 to save as many as 15 lives (via charitable donation). Effective altruism—indeed, P3 
itself—makes it clear what the P1-believer should do here: Donate rather than adopt. This does not 
imply that the P1-believer thinks embryos are not persons (or not valuable). It simply operates on 
the assumption that each life counts equally. And fifteen is greater than one. Hence, saving up to 
fifteen lives is the better course of action than saving one life (at most).  
 
 
25 Yuan, Y., Mai, Q., Ma, J., Deng, M., Xu, Y., Zhuang, G., & Zhou, C. (2018). What was the fate of human embryos 
following long-term cryopreservation (≥12 years) and frozen embryo transfer? Human Reproduction, 34(1), 52–55. 
26 Lovering (2013), op. cit. note 1 and Lovering (2017), op. cit. note 1.  
27 Singer, P. (2015). The most good you can do: how effective altruism is changing ideas about living ethically. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
28 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note 2, p. 3 n. 14.  
29 GiveWell (2017). Cost-effectiveness. URL = https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-
effectiveness. 
This problem becomes worse for Lovering when we recall his claim that “the likelihood of a 
successful birth via IVF is low (around 36%).”30 Assuming Lovering is right, the P1-believer really 
has a choice between spending $8,000 on a 36% chance to save (at most) one life, or spending 
$8,000 on a much higher chance of saving between one and fifteen lives.31 Again, if someone 
accepts P3, it is abundantly clear what they must do: Donate, rather than adopt. As such, Lovering’s 
claim that P1-believers ought to adopt embryos—because doing so does not require that they 
sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance—is patently false. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have agreed with Lovering that some people who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is 
a very bad thing have the power to prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo 
adoption. We have denied, however, that they can do so without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral significance. We have shown that there are numerous other strategies for saving 
frozen embryos that are likely to be far more effective. We have also noted that those who believe 
the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing are likely to also believe that the deaths of  embryos 
by induced abortion or spontaneously abortion are also a very bad thing—and so these far greater 
numbers of deaths must also be considered when determining moral obligations. Finally, the costs 
of embryo adoption may be such that these resources are better directed to saving the lives of 
 
30 Lovering (2019), op. cit. note, 2, p. 4.  
31 The Against Malaria Foundation, for example, reports that “even with holes” malaria nets—which cost only $2.00 
apiece—are “99% effective.” Furthermore, they estimate that for “every 100-1,000 nets we put over heads and beds, 
one child doesn’t die.” Based on their estimates, therefore, this means that (approximately) for every $200-$2,000 
spent, one child doesn’t die. Thus, even in the worst case scenario, the P1-believer may suppose their $8,000 will save 
somewhere around four lives if donated (as opposed to securing a fraction of a chance at saving one life, if embryo 
adoption is pursued). See, Against Malaria Foundation (2020). Why nets? URL = 
https://www.againstmalaria.com/WhyNets.aspx.  
humans who are already born and at risk of preventable diseases such as malaria—indeed, Peter 
Singer’s effective altruism entails this is obligatory.  
 
